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Abstract — In this paper, we present an effective 
intrusion response engine combined with intrusion 
detection in ad hoc networks. The intrusion response 
engine is composed of a secure communication module, 
a local and a global response module. Its function is 
based on an innovative tree-based key agreement 
protocol while the intrusion detection engine is based 
on a class of neural networks called eSOM. The 
proposed intrusion response model and the tree-based 
protocol, it is based on, are analyzed concerning key 
secrecy while the intrusion detection engine is 
evaluated for MANET under different traffic 
conditions and mobility patterns. The results show a 
high detection rate for packet dropping attacks. 
Keywords – Ad Hoc Networks, Intrusion Response, 
Intrusion Detection, Key Agreement Protocol. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are many “flavours” of ad hoc networks. In 
this paper, we refer to an open ad hoc network 
composed of a set of nodes that are characterized by 
short membership duration since there is a large 
number of joining and leaving events. In order to 
achieve security in ad hoc networks, complementary 
to intrusion prevention techniques there is a need for 
reactive mechanisms, such as intrusion detection and 
response.  
Intrusion Detection is a mature arsenal for the 
defense of wired networks, but it is still in its infancy 
in the area of ad hoc networks. Nevertheless, there 
are some proposed IDS systems for ad hoc networks.  
Zhang and Lee [1] proposed the first (high-level) 
specific for ad hoc networks IDS approach. They 
proposed a distributed and cooperative anomaly-
based IDS, which provides an efficient guide for the 
design of IDS in wireless ad hoc networks. Huang 
and Lee [2] extended their previous work in a 
cluster-based IDS, in order to combat the resource 
constraints that MANET face. Liu et al. [3] proposed 
a completely distributed anomaly detection 
approach. They investigated the use of the MAC 
layer in order to profile normal behavior of mobile 
nodes and then applied cross-feature analysis on 
feature vectors constructed from the training data.  
Furthermore, effective intrusion detection should 
be combined with an efficient and secure intrusion 
response. Intrusion response in order to be efficient 
and secure should be based on security mechanisms 
such as group key management and agreement.  
However, most of the proposed key management 
protocols ([4], [5], [6]) for wired networks can not be 
applied in an infrastructure-less or resource sensitive 
environment such as ad hoc networks. In the 
Octopus protocol [4], four nodes compose a 22 −cube 
and the rest members of the network are “tentacles” 
that are connected to one of the central nodes. In a 
dynamic ad hoc network, it is not easy to maintain 
such a topology. The Tree-Group Diffie-Hellman 
(TGDH) proposed by [5], which is based on a binary 
tree structure and improves the performances of the 
IKA1/2 [6], is based on modular exponentiation 
which is the most expensive operation thus, it might 
require O(n) exponentiations in order to compute the 
group session key. 
Hwang and Chang [7] have proposed a key 
agreement protocol that is based on a shared group 
password, the exclusive-OR (XOR) operation and a 
binary tree structure. Although this approach is really 
efficient for ad hoc networks it is susceptible to 
password guessing and replay attacks. Lo [8] et. al. 
have improved the previous approach [7] by adding 
mutual authentication and adding a procedure for 
periodic session key updates. However, their 
approach is still susceptible to dictionary and brute 
force attacks since it is based on passwords. 
In this paper, we propose an Intrusion Response 
engine and an Intrusion Detection engine based on a 
class of neural networks called emergent Self-
Organizing Maps (eSOM), in order to ensure the 
direct response to possible attacks and the effective 
exploitation of the information visualization that 
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Fig. 1. Intrusion Detection Architecture
eSOM provide, for every node. The proposed 
Intrusion Response engine is based on an 
authenticated key agreement protocol, which has 
some unique characteristics including the use of a 
shared master key and the structure of a rooted tree, 
which depends on the distance between the ad hoc 
nodes and consequently a unique protocol flow. 
Using this protocol we are able to generate Local 
Keys (LK) and a Global Key (GK) in order to secure 
the communication of the proposed Intrusion 
Response engine. 
  
Fig. 2. Emergent SOM U-Matrix of a node of an ad hoc 
network  
II. 
III. 
INTRUSION DETECTION MODEL 
The IDS architecture we adopt is composed of 
multiple local IDS agents, as illustrated in Fig. 1, that 
are responsible for detecting possible intrusions 
locally. The collection of all the independent IDS 
agents forms the IDS system for the ad hoc network. 
Each local IDS agent is composed of the following 
components:                                                           
Data collector: is responsible for selecting local 
audit data and activity logs. 
Intrusion Detection engine: is responsible for 
detecting local anomalies using local audit data. The 
local anomaly detection is performed according to 
the following procedure:  Select labeled audit data and perform the 
appropriate transformations.  Compute the classifier using training data and 
the eSOM algorithm.  Apply the classifier to test local audit data in 
order to classify it as normal or abnormal. 
An example of an eSOM map is illustrated in 
Fig. 2. We have to note here, that the integrity of the 
generated eSOM map is assured with integrity 
mechanisms such as a MAC (Message 
Authentication Code) or a hash function. 
Intrusion Response Engine: If the Intrusion 
Detection Engine detects an intrusion then the 
Intrusion Response Engine is activated. Each node of 
the ad hoc network is able to participate in the 
Intrusion Response Engine. The Intrusion Response 
Engine is responsible for sending a local and a global 
alarm in order to notify the nodes of the ad hoc 
network about the incident of an intrusion. The 
proposed Intrusion Response Engine is composed of 
three main modules: the Communication Module, the 
Local Response Module and the Global Response 
Module. The Local Response Module is activated 
every time an intrusion is detected by the Intrusion 
Detection Engine while the Global Response Module 
is activated only in serious cases of attacks i.e the 
eSOM map of a node (Fig. 2) is covered in its 
biggest part (over two thirds (2/3)) with signs of 
attack (light color). 
PROPOSED INTRUSION DETECTION ENGINE 
The Intrusion detection engine is based on 
emergent Self Organizing maps [9] a special class of 
neural networks. We have used the distance based 
(U-Matrix) method in order to visualize the 
structures generated by eSOM. The U-Matrix is a 
display of the U-heights on top of the grid positions 
of the neurons on the map. The input data set is 
displayed and depicted at a 3D landscape. The height 
will have a large value in areas of the map where one 
finds a few data points and small value in areas that 
represent clusters, creating hills and valleys 
correspondingly. 
In our examples, we trained eSOM with logs of 
network traffic selected from a simulated MANET  
and used eSOM U-matrices [9] to perform intrusion 
detection. A vector represents each log of network 
traffic with some fixed attributes. Each vector has a 
unique spatial position in the U-Matrix while the 
distance between two points is the dissimilarity of 
two network traffic logs. The U-Matrix of the trained 
dataset is divided into valleys that represent clusters 
of normal or attack data and hills that represent 
borders between clusters. Depending on the position 
of the best match of an input data point that 
characterizes a connection, this point may belong to 
a valley (cluster (normal or attack behavior)) or this 
data point may not be classified if its best match 
belongs to a hill (boundary). The map that is created 
after the training of the eSOM, will represent the 
network traffic. Thus, an input data point may be 
classified depending on the position of its best 
match. We exploit the advantages of key agreement 
protocols in order to verify the authenticity and 
integrity of the maps.       
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Fig. 3. Intrusion Response Engine 
IV. 
A. 
      PROPOSED INTRUSION RESPONSE ENGINE 
The Intrusion Response engine and its 
components are illustrated in Fig. 3. The 
Communication Module is responsible for the 
agreement of the local keys (LK) and a global key 
(GK) that will be used in the local and global 
response modules, respectively. 
The Local Response Module is responsible for 
the secure distribution of the global eSOM map, 
generated by a node using its eSOM map and the 
local eSOM maps of all its one-hop away neighbors. 
In order to verify the integrity and authenticity of 
the global eSOM map we apply a Local Map 
Distribution Protocol. The generated global eSOM 
map is used for the visualization of the security 
status of the local ad hoc network composed of one-
hop neighbors of a node. This map also helps nodes 
to select the most appropriate and secure 
neighboring node for message forwarding. The 
Global Response Module is responsible for the 
notification of all neighbors in the communication 
range of the attacked node. 
 
Communication module 
We propose an authenticated group key 
agreement protocol, which is based on the group key 
agreement protocols proposed by Lo et. al. [8] and 
Huang and Chang [7]. Our protocol adopts the 
exclusive-OR (XOR) operation proposed by [7], [8] 
and not modular or exponential calculations that 
have extremely high computational cost. 
Furthermore, it employs some unique characteristics 
that make it even more secure. It uses a shared 
secret master key (KM) and it is based on the 
structure of a rooted tree which depends on the 
distance between the ad hoc nodes. This results in a 
unique protocol flow. 
In the following paragraphs we give a short 
description of the way the Group Key Agreement 
(GKA) protocol functions. Table I provides the 
description for every notation used in the description 
of the GKA protocol and the local and global 
response modules. Our authenticated key agreement 
protocol is not based on passwords as in [7] and [8], 
since such protocols are susceptible to dictionary and 
brute force attacks. In our scenario, there are n 
members sharing a secret master key KM. KM is 
shared among all nodes in the ad hoc network and it 
is used for the initial communication. Although KM 
can be used as a first step in order to setup a secure 
communication it is neither efficient nor sufficient to 
be used for a secure session communication. In 
addition, our proposed key agreement protocol is not 
based in a complete binary tree as in [8] but in a 
simple rooted tree. 
We assume that there are n members M1, M2, …, 
Mn, in an ad hoc network that want to have a secure 
communication. Initially, each member of this group 
has a unique identity number IDi, for i= 1, 2, …, n. 
These members cooperate based on a rooted tree. In 
this rooted tree structure, every node is either a leaf 
or a parent of one or more children nodes. The nodes 
are denoted with each member’s unique number. In 
this group, we assign member MCh to be a 
“Checker”. The checker is a group member that is 
randomly selected between the one-hop neighbors of 
the root node. The checker does not participate in the 
tree structure, but has an additional role to confirm 
the session key correctness. In case that the 
randomly selected MCh leaves the group of nodes due 
TABLE I 
GKA ALGORITHM NOTATIONS DESCRIPTION 
Notation Description 
Mi Member i 
Md The member in a descendant node 
Ma The member in an ascendant node 
Mat
The member of the ad hoc network that is the victim of 
an attack 
jC
M  The member of the ad hoc network that is the jth child 
of its parent node in the tree structure 
ML
The member of the ad hoc network that leaves the ad 
hoc network (leave protocol) 
IDi Member i’s identity 
KM Master Key 
H( ) One – way hash function 
Si Member i’s contributory key  
z Subkey generated by  11,..., −nMM
Ki’, Ki
Ki’ is the intermediate key and Ki is the session key hold 
by Mi.  
noncei Member i generated random number 
iT  
The tree path of member node Mi along its parent node 
to root node (ex. in Figure 2 the key path T5 of node M5 
is M5ÆM2ÆM1) ⊕  XOR operation 
||  Concatenation 
mapi The eSOM map of member node i  
LK Local  secret Key 
GK Global secret Key 
Br. The corresponding message is broadcasted. 
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               Subkey z generation by M1 to M17. 
to mobility reasons, the root node is able to detect 
this movement and select another one-hop neighbor 
as a “checker”.  
The rooted tree is constructed based on the 
distance between nodes and their unique numbers. If 
we assume that level 0 is the root of the tree and it is 
situated in node M1 with ID number ID1, then in 
level one will be situated its one-hop neighbors; in 
level two its two-hop away neighboring nodes until 
the last level where the most distant nodes of node 
that are in its transmission range, will be situated. 
Fig. 4 illustrates an example of a key tree with 17 
members. In the key tree, its root is located at level 
l=0 and its height is h, where h=4.  
1M
Our goal is all nodes in the ad hoc network to 
agree upon a session key K:  
nSSSK ⊕⊕⊕= ....21 ,                                        (2) 
where Si is contributed by Mi and it is randomly 
selected. The protocol is divided into two phases: the 
key initiation phase and the session key generation 
phase. In the key initiation phase, M1, M2, …, Mn (we 
except the checker node MCh) cooperate to secretly 
construct a subkey z: .                (3)                         nSSSz ⊕⊕⊕= ...21
In the session key generation phase, each Mi (i= 1, 
2, …, n and i≠ch) engages in a separate exchange 
with MCh. After this exchange all members have 
sufficient information to compute the session key K. 
Member node MCh, also verifies that the other 
members generated the same session key K. We 
introduce our method in detail in the following 
subsections. 
1) Key Initiation Phase 
Initially, all member nodes are considered to be 
malicious unless proven otherwise. A node that starts 
the normal communication process (key initiation 
phase) is considered to be valid. The proposed key 
initiation phase follows a unique protocol flow based 
on the structure of a rooted tree depending on the 
distance of the ad hoc nodes. Each member Mi 
chooses a random quantity Si. For i≠ch, all member 
nodes perform three steps to achieve mutual 
authentication. The protocol flow of the Key 
Initiation Phase is the following: 
For (i≠ch): Steps 1 to 3 are used for mutual 
authentication. 
Step 1  
     )||||(,, dadKad nonceIDIDEIDID M aMdM
 
Step 1  
     )||||(,, dadKad nonceIDIDEIDID M aMdM
 Step 2 
)||1||||(,, addaKda noncenonceIDIDEIDID M +    aMdM
 
Step 3 
)'||1||||(,, iadaKda KnonceIDIDEIDID M
+
  aMdM
  If Mi is a leaf node then .  (4) ii SK =′ If  Mi  is a parent node and has one or more 
children represented as Cj (j= 1 ,…, l), then: 
lCCii KKSK
′⊕⊕′⊕=′ ...1 .   (5)  If Mi is the root node (i=1) then M1 computes the 
subkey z 
n
CCC
SSS
j
KKKSz ⊕⊕⊕= ′⊕⊕′⊕′⊕= ... ...2121 1                   (6) 
An example of the subkey z generation mechanism 
for nodes  for i=1,2,…,17 and i≠5 is illustrated 
in Fig. 4. At the end of this phase the local keys LK 
of the one-hop neighbors of the root node are 
calculated and are used in the Local Response 
module: 
iM
jj SzLKLK ⊕==                             (7) 
where j are all the one-hop neighbors of the root 
node and consequently belong in the first level of the 
tree. 
2) Session key agreement phase 
The subkey ( )nSSSz ⊕⊕⊕= ...21  generated by M1 at 
the end of the key initiation phase is used in the 
session key agreement phase. The protocol flow of 
the Key Agreement Phase is the following: 
Step 1 
    Br.                  , )||||(, 111 noncezIDEID MK iM1M
                   for i=2, 3, …, n 
Step 2
ChM  Br.  )||1||||(, 1 ChChChKCh noncenonceSIDMEID + iM
  for  i= 1, 2, …, n and i≠ch 
Step 3 
                 )||1||(,, iChChChi KnonceIDHIDID + iMChM
Step 4 
checks session key K. ChM
The session key K agreed in this phase is the 
Global Key (GK) that will be used in the Global 
Response module: ChSzKGK ⊕== .                   (8) 
3) Membership events 
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Fig. 5. Key tree after a new node joins in the fourth level.
In a dynamic ad hoc network member nodes may 
join or leave the group, after the session key is 
generated. The new members are not authorized to 
know the session key agreed before they join the ad 
hoc network. Thus, the member nodes of the ad hoc 
network should change the agreed session key and 
the shared secret master key also. In the same man- 
ner, in case a node leaves the ad hoc network the 
session key should be changed in order to verify the 
secure communication of the remaining nodes. 
Thus, we need a Member Joining and a Member 
Leaving Protocol. This section describes the 
Member Joining Protocol. The Member Leaving 
Protocol is similar to the one described in [7] 
although it follows our new protocol flow and the 
structure of a simple rooted tree. Due to limited 
space it is not included in this paper but it is 
available in the extended version of the paper [10]. 
Member Joining Protocol 
The proposed member joining protocol follows 
the protocol flow implied by the structure of the 
rooted tree. Let us assume that the group has n 
members: M1, M2, …, Mn and a new member Mn+1  
wants to join a group of nodes. The new member 
sends a joining request message which includes its 
ID (IDn+1). The new member will be allowed to join 
the group when the members in the group receive 
this message and accept it. Furthermore, the 
members of the group must change the master key 
from KM to K’M and reconstruct the session key. 
The procedure that will be followed depends on 
how close to the root node M1 the new member node 
Mn+1 will be. Thus, if the new member node Mn+1 is 
a one-hop neighbor of the root node M1 then it will 
be situated in level one, if it is a two-hop neighbor 
of the root node M1, and consequently one-hop 
neighbor node of a parent node in level one, it will 
be situated in level two. If we suppose that the new 
member node Mn+1 is l-hops away from root node 
M1, then its position in the rooted tree will be in the l 
th  level and would be a child of the node of which it 
is a one-hop neighbor. Then the member nodes in 
the key path Mn+1ÆMl-1ÆMl-2Æ…ÆM1 where    Ml-
1(Ml-2) represents the member node that is situated in 
l-1st (l-2nd) level and it is parent node one (two)-hop 
neighbor of the new member node (respectively), 
perform the key initiation phase. 
An example of a new member node Mn+1  joining 
a group of n members M1, M2, …,Mn  is illustrated in 
Fig. 5 where the new member will become a leaf 
node. The new member node Mn+1 is a three-hop 
neighbor of a root node M1, a two-hop neighbor of 
member node M2 and a one-hop neighbor of 
member node M6. Each of the members Mi, except 
the root M1 on the key-path Tn+1, 
Mn+1ÆM6ÆM2ÆM1 performs the key initialization 
phase. Particularly, if Md is a descendant node and 
Ma is an ancestor node in the key path then the 
following protocol flow of the Tree Path Key 
Initiation phase is performed: 
Step a 
              
)||||(,, dadKad enoncIDIDEIDID M
′′′ aMdM
Step b
dM )||1||||(,, addaKda enoncenoncIDIDEIDID M
′′+′′′ aM  
Step c 
)||1||||(,,
″+′′′ iadaKda KenoncIDIDEIDID M     aMdM
  If Mi is a leaf node, then .               (9) ii SK ′′=′′ If Mi is a parent node and has one or more 
children represented as Cj (j= 1,…,l), then  
l
KKSK CCii ′′⊕⊕′′⊕′′=′′ ...1 .               (10)  If ’s child is not in the key path, then iM jCM
jj CC
KK ′=′′ ,                             (11)  If is the root node ( ), then computes 
the subkey 
iM 1=i 1M
z ′  using the of the members in 
the key path and the of the other members of 
the tree and computes the new sub key: 
iK ′′
iK
jCCC
KKKSz ′⊕⊕′⊕′⊕=′ ...
211
               (12) 
Finally,  performs the algorithm of the key 
agreement phase (section IV.A.2) to reconstruct and 
verify a new session key. 
1M
4) Periodic Session Key Update 
If no member joining or leaving events take 
place for a long period of time, the session key K, 
must be changed in order to prevent it from possible 
exposure and to verify its security strength. The 
protocol flow of the Periodical Global Session Key 
Update follows the one described in [8]. We note   
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Fig. 6. Functioning of Local Response Module 
here that the new session key newK  is the new 
Global Key ( ) that will be used in the Global 
Response Module:      (13) 
newGK
Choldnewnew SKKGK ′′⊕==
Except of the periodical update of the Global 
Key the Local Keys used by the Local Response 
module should also be updated after a long period of   
time. The protocol flow of the Periodical Local 
Keys Update is the following: 
Step 1 
                )||||(, jjjLKj nonceSIDEID old
″
1MjM
where j is a node in level 1 of the tree 
Step 2 
computes the new Local Keys, ,jM
joldjnew SLKKLLK ′′⊕=′=               (14) 
Step 3 
 )||1||(, jjjj KLnonceIDHID ′+               1MjM
Step 4 
1M  checks the new Local Keys jnew KLLK ′= . 
B. Local Response Module 
The Local Response Module is responsible for 
generating the eSOM map of the one-hop node 
connectivity network. More precisely, in a local ad 
hoc network each node creates its local eSOM map 
through the Intrusion Detection Engine. Each node 
transfers its local eSOM map, through the Local 
Map Distribution Protocol, to all its one-hop 
neighbors. The way the Local Map Distribution 
Protocol functions is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
Suppose that we have a group of ad hoc nodes  
 and , for i=2, 3, …, n, that are one-
hop away neighbors of node M
nMM ,...,1 iM
1, then the protocol 
flow of the Local Map Distribution Protocol is the 
following: 
Step 1 
1M
,...,3,2=  Br.   )||||(, 111,11 noncemapIDHmapID LK iM        for i  n
Step 2 
1M          )||1||(,, 1 iiLKii mapnonceIDHmapID + iM
                                                           for i=2, 3, …, n  
Step 3 
1M  creates the local map of one-hop neighbors 
Step 4 
1M
C. 
Br.  )||||(,, 111 nonceGlobMapIDHGlobMapID LK iM
    for i=2, 3, …, n 
In Fig.6, nodes C, B, D and G are one-hop 
neighbors of node A. Nodes B, C, D and G create  
their own eSOM U-Matrix and use the local map 
distribution protocol in order to transfer securely 
their map to node A. Node A selects the local 
authenticated eSOM U-Matrices from its neighbors, 
creates its own map and then creates the global map 
of its local network. By observing the global map of 
its local network, node A is able to have a view of 
the security status of its neighboring nodes. Based 
on this information node A selects the appropriate 
node in order to forward its messages. By observing 
the local maps of all its neighboring nodes and by 
considering as secure the nodes that are not victims 
of attacks, node A selects an appropriate node for 
message forwarding. 
Global Response Module 
The Global Response Module is responsible for 
notifying all the neighbors of the attacked node 
, not only the ones that are one-hop away but 
all nodes in its transmission range (M
atM
i, for i=1, 2, 
…, n  and  i≠at), that there is a possible intrusion in 
this node. The notification of all nodes in the 
transmission range of the attacked node is 
performed using the Global Response - Map 
Distribution Protocol.   
Suppose that we have a group of ad hoc nodes 
M1, …, Mr and Mi, for i =2, 3, …, r, that are all 
nodes in the transmission range of member node M1 
and Mat is a member node that is a possible victim of 
the attack then the protocol flow of the Global 
Response-Map Distribution Protocol is the 
following:  
Step 1 
 Br.       M  )||||(, atatatGKat noncemapIDHID iatM
   for i=1, 2, …, n  and  i≠at  
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Figure 7. Functioning of Global Response Module
Step 2 
Mi, for i=1, 2, …, n  and  i≠at removes Mat from its 
routing tables. 
The keyed hash function uses the global key GK 
generated by the communication module:  
ChSzKGK ⊕== .                                      (15) 
Fig. 7 depicts an example of how the Global 
Response Module functions. In this figure three 
local ad hoc networks are illustrated. One with one- 
hop neighbors for node C (including nodes A, B, D, 
E, F, G, H), one with one-hop neighbors for node I 
(including nodes J, K, L, M, N, O), and one with 
one-hop neighbors for node P (including nodes Q, 
R, S, T, U, V, W). We suppose that the Intrusion 
Detection Engine has detected node D as the victim 
of an attack. Then the Global Response Module is 
activated and the local eSOM map of node D is 
distributed using the Global Response – Map 
Distribution Protocol in order to notify all neighbors 
in the communication range of node D about the 
attack so that all neighbors remove the attacked 
node from their routing tables and update the paths 
they use for their message transmissions. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
The simulated network has no preexisting 
infrastructure and that the employed ad hoc routing 
protocol is AODV. We implemented the simulator 
within the ns-2 library. Our simulation modeled a 
network of 50 hosts placed randomly within an 1800 
× 1000 m2 area. Each node has a radio propagation 
range of 250 m and the channel capacity was 2 
Mbps. The nodes in the simulation move according 
to the ‘random way point’ model. The minimum and 
maximum speed is set to 0 and 10 m/s, respectively, 
and pause times at 0, 20, 50, 70 and 200 sec. A 
pause time of 0 sec corresponds to the continuous 
motion of the node and a pause time of 200 sec 
corresponds to the time that the node is stationary.  
We evaluated the performance of our proposed 
intrusion detection engine for 5, 10, 15 and 20 
malicious nodes. The malicious behavior is carried 
between 50 and 200 sec. The nodes perform 
normally between 0 and 50 sec. On average, twenty 
traffic generators were developed to simulate 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) data rate to 
ten destination nodes. The sending packets have 
random sizes and exponential inter-arrival times. 
The mean size of the data payload was 512 bytes. 
Each run is executed for 200 sec of simulation time 
with a feature-sampling interval of one sec.  
We simulated a constant selective packet-
dropping attack where the attacker simply discards 
all data packets while it functions legitimately 
concerning routing and MAC layer packets. This 
type of attack is extremely difficult to detect if we 
consider that packet dropping is due to a malicious 
behavior or mobility. The malicious node exhibit 
malicious behavior when it is most advantageous to 
him and not from the beginning of the traffic.  
The statistical features we have used have been 
introduced by Liu et al. [3] and are the following: 
Network allocation vector (NAV), Transmission 
traffic rate, Reception traffic rate, Retransmission 
rates of RTS packets, Retransmission rates of DATA 
packets, Active neighbor node count, Forwarding 
node count. We have normalized the data with mean 
zero and variance one.   
For the evaluation we have used the Databionics 
eSOM tool [11]. The evaluation proves that we can 
achieve a differentiation between normal and 
abnormal behaviors concerning packet-dropping 
attacks. The best matches of the trained dataset and, 
thus, the corresponding dataset were manually 
grouped into clusters representing normal and attack 
behavior. Thus, we identify the regions of the map 
that represent a cluster that can be used for the 
classification on new datasets. The eSOM of a 
trained dataset is depicted in Fig. 2. As it can be 
clearly seen the training data set has been divided in 
two classes, normal data class (dark color) and 
packet dropping data class (light color). To evaluate 
the efficiency of the proposed intrusion detection 
engine we use the Detection rate and the False 
alarm rate. 
Fig. 8 presents the average Detection rate of all 
source nodes that present traffic activity regarding 
the used pause times. The detection rate seems not 
to be influenced by the mobility and in all cases to 
be over 80%. For long pause times the rate slightly 
020
40
60
80
100
120
0 20 50 70 200
Pause Time (sec)
D
et
ec
tio
n
 
R
at
e 
(%
)
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Fig. 9. Detection Rate vs. Number of Malicious Nodes
reduces which is due to the TCP traffic and the 
degradation of the mobility of the network.  
The detection rate as a function of the number of 
malicious nodes is presented in Fig. 9. The rate is 
rather high and always over 80%. When few 
malicious nodes exist in the network, the 
connections that are influenced by them are also a 
few. Thus, the detection rate is decreased. When the 
number of malicious nodes is high compared to the 
number of source nodes, the TCP connections 
generated are a few, leading to a decrease in the 
detection rate. 
Tables II and III present the average false alarm 
rate as a function of the paused times used and the 
number of malicious nodes, respectively. When a 
source node generates traffic to different 
destinations and one of these connections is 
influenced by malicious nodes, then eSOM finds it 
difficult to distinguish among normal and abnormal 
traffic.  
Through the proposed GKA protocol, the 
following security goals are achieved: key secrecy, 
key independence, forward secrecy, backward 
secrecy [8]. Key Secrecy is achieved since the key 
can be computed only by the group members. 
Moreover, since the disclosure of any set or group 
keys, does not lead to the disclosure of any other 
group key, key independence is also achieved. The 
compromise of current session secrets does not 
imply compromise of future session’s secrets. Thus 
a leaving member is prevented from accessing the 
group communications and forward secrecy is 
achieved. The disclosure of current session secrets 
does not imply the disclosure of past session secrets, 
thus Backward Secrecy is also achieved.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Our intrusion detection engine presents a rather 
high detection rate and its main advantage is the 
visual representation of the normal-attack state in a 
MANET. Moreover, it has the ability to 
immediately respond in the case of a possible 
intrusion by selecting the more secure node as 
indicated by its U-Matrix map for forwarding the 
information. In order to verify the reliability and 
avoid possible alteration of the maps the proposed 
key agreement protocol must be used. 
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TABLE III 
FALSE  ALARMS VS NUMBER OF MALICIOUS NODES 
Malicious  nodes False Alarm (%) 
5 26 
10 22 
15 17 
20 21 
TABLE II 
FALSE  ALARMS VS PAUSE  -TIME 
Pause time (sec) False Alarm (%) 
0 21 
20 20 
50 22 
70 20 
